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THE DROIT DE SUITE: WHY AMERICAN FINE
ARTISTS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO A
RESALE ROYALTY
Michael B. Reddy*
"[C]opyright could... stand upon no other foundation,
than natural justice and common law."'
"The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right
[sic] of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a
right at common law.... The public good fully coincides...
with the claims of individuals."
2
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant.., copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors .... 
3
"I've been working my ass off just for you to make that profit!"
4
I. INTRODUCnON
The droit de suite,5 or an artist's resale royalty, was first enacted into
* Michael Reddy is currently the Assistant Director of the library and an adjunct professor
at the John Marshall Law School. The author dedicates this article to American fine artists and
their advocates.
.1. Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 207 (L.B. 1769).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
3. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
4. Painter Robert Rauschenberg to art collector Robert Scull after the resale of his painting
'Thaw" for $85,000, the painting was purchased ten years earlier by Scull for $900. R. DOFFY,
ART LAW: REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS AND COLLECrORS 264 (1977) (citing Roger
Ricklefs, Artists Decide They Should Share Profits on Resale of Paintings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
1974, at 1; Robert Hughes, A Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists, TIME, Mar. 11, 1974, at
66).
5. The phrase droit de suite comes from French real property law. An owner or creditor has
a "right of following" (literal translation) to pursue the current holder of the property, even a bona
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law by France in 1920.6 Since then, French fine artists have had the right
to be paid a royalty from the proceeds of any resale of their work.' Often
characterized as a pecuniary right,8 the droit de suite is more accurately
defined as a hybrid of the moral right (droit moral) and the author's right
(droit d'auteur),9 because it is an offshoot of both the inalienable right of
paternity I° and the right to participate in the future economic exploitation
of a work."
Since its introduction nearly seventy-five years ago, the droit de suite
has been adopted by twenty-eight nations 2 and has been incorporated into
Article 14ter of the Berne Convention. 3 In 1976, California passed the
fide one, to satisfy claims against it. Barbara Ringer, Book Review, 16 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 247, 250.
6. Law of May 20, 1920, 1920 B.L.D. 236, 20 Duv. & Boc. 539, Imposing on Public Sales
of Artworks A Right Inuring to the Benefit of Artists, reprinted in LiLIANE DE PIERREDON-
FAWCEIT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 4 (Louise-Martin-
Valiquette trans., 1991).
7. For a recent codification of the droit de suite in French copyright law, see Loi du 11 Mars
1957, No. 57-296, Sur La Propriete Literaire Artistique, J.O., translated in UNESCO, Copyright
Laws and Treaties of the World (1976).
8. Rita E. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the
Underprivileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 13-14
(1962).
9. LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETr, THE DRoIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
PROPERTY 32 (Louise-Martin-Valiquette trans., 1991) ("The droit de suite merges into and
combines with the moral right, a personality right, and assumes some of its characteristics.")
(citations omitted).
10. ld at 31.
In his report on the bill to inaugurate the droit de suite, Abel Ferry maintained:
"The invisible bonds which connect the author to his painting are made explicit by
us in the statutory language.... We establish in the law that paternity which the
dealer or the collector appeals to for speculative purposes but that they seek to
minimize in the interest of greater profit." According to this theory, the droit de
suite has no autonomous existence but is a consequence of the Moral right [of
paternity].
Id. (citation omitted).
11. lI at 32-33.
Taking, as it does, the form of an automatic collection of a sum of money on each
resale of the work, the droit de suite actually is, among authors' rights, the one
which has the clearest pecuniary aspect: there is exploitation without the author's
approval .... In this context, the droit de suite would be essentially an economic
right.
IdL
12. Algeria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, France,
Germany, Guinea, Holy See, Hungary, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali,
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.
See DE PIERREDON-FAWCEIT, supra note 9, at 6.
13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
completed at Paris, May 4, 1896; revised in 1908, 1914, 1928, 1948, 1967, and most recently in
Paris in 1971, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1986), 3 Copyright Laws and
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first droit de suite legislation in the United States. 4 In addition, in the
last fifteen years there have been numerous unsuccessful attempts by the
United States Congress to amend the Copyright Act"5 to provide for a
federal resale royalty.16 However, when President Bush signed legislation
in 1990 protecting the moral rights of fine artists, 7 the Register of
Copyrights was required to study and report on the advisability of enacting
a federal resale royalty right.
18
A Report was issued by the Register in December of 1992."9 The
Report emphasized that more evidence regarding the possible effects of a
resale royalty on artists and the art market should be gathered, and it
ultimately recommended against the adoption of the droit de suite.20 The
Report also advised the United States to wait and see if the nations of
Europe would proceed with plans to harmonize their intellectual property
laws, including the droit de suite.2' The Register concluded the Report
by providing a model resale royalty system for Congress to use if it later
decided to amend the 1976 Act.' Given the controversial nature of the
droit de suite, there have been both supporters' and critics24 of the
Report.
This Article argues that Congress should adopt a resale royalty
provision on the grounds that it would: (1) redress the unfair treatment
historically given American creators of fine art' under our nation's
Treaties of the World (BNA), Multilateral Conventions, Berne Copyright Union: Item H-I at 1,
art. 14ter.
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
16. S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) and H.R. 5722, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986); S.
1619, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) and H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
17. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "VARA"].
18. Id. at § 608(b) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1976 & Supp. 1992)).
19. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROrT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST'S RESALE ROYALTY (1992)
[hereinafter '?REPORT"].
20. Id. at xv.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 151.
23. See John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
241 (1993); see also Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual
Artists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 265 (1993).
24. See Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of
Copyrights' Report, 40 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 284 (1993); Carol Sky, Report of the Register of
Copyrights Concerning Droit de Suite, The Artist's Resale Royalty: A Response, 40 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 315 (1993).
25. For purposes of this Article, the term "fine art" is defined in the same way as the term
"visual art" in VARA, e.g., "a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, [or]
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer ..." VARA, supra note 17, at § 602 (codified at 17
1995]
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copyright laws; 26 (2) fulfill the original intent of the Copyright Clause27
by providing an economic incentive for the creators of fine art;'s (3)
conform with the natural law bases of both French and Anglo-American
copyright;29 and (4) advance the economic interests of the United States
by bringing American copyright law into harmony with thirty-six other
members of the Berne Convention.3°
First, the Article will review the general history of moral rights3' and
the droit de suite,32 with special emphasis on their French origins.33
Second, the Article will examine efforts to introduce the droit de suite into
American law, culminating with the passage of the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 ("VARA"). M Third, it will review criticisms of the Report
of the Register of Copyright and summarize rebuttals to the four main
arguments made against the droit de suite.35 Finally, the Article will
make four arguments in favor of adopting of a resale royalty, and will
conclude that legislation providing American fine artists with this right
should be passed by the United States Congress.
II. ORIGINS OF THE DROIT DE SUITE
A. Moral Rights Generally
To understand the specific origins of the fine artist's droit de suite,
one must first examine the development in France of the moral rights of
U.S.C. § 101) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
26. See Donald M. Millinger, Copyright and the Fine Artist, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 354
(1980); Jacqueline Fabe, The Fine Artist's Right to the Reproductions of His Original Work, 23
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81 (1977); Daniel Brenner, A Two-Phase Approach to
Copyrighting the Fine Arts, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 85 (1976).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Thomas M. Goetzl, In Support of the Resale Royalty, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 249,
259 (1989).
29. See Gary Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society's Primacy in
Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381 (1985).
30. See Karen Y. Crabbs, The Future of Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights in America, 26
BEVERLY HILs B.A.J. 167, 168 (1992).
31. See Dan Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, An American Revolution,
2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155 (1983).
32. For a comprehensive history of the droit de suite, see J.-L. DUCHEMIN, LE DRoIT DE
SuiTE DES ARTISTs 149 (1948).
33. See DE PIERREDON-FAWCEIr, supra note 9, at 1-6.
34. See Thomas M. Goetzl & Smart A. Sutton, Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display
Right: A New Doctrinal Analysis, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 15 (1984).
35. See Merryman, supra note 23; see also Alderman, supra note 23.
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creators generally, because the droit de suite is the natural outgrowth of
French moral rights jurisprudence.36 While the role of the artist in Europe
had been changing for centuries, the French Revolution provided the
impetus for granting French artists the first economic rights in their works.
Thereafter, the French courts expanded on these rights granted by the
legislature, and ultimately provided artists with the familiar forms of moral
rights that are recognized throughout the world today.
37
Until the Renaissance, individual artists merely produced works to
satisfy the desire of their royal and ecclesiastical patrons in exchange for
their patronage.3  "The Renaissance restored the importance of Man as
an Individual and thus completely transformed the artist's status. 39
Artists began to sign their works, and the law began to develop rules for
protecting the distinctive expression of an individual's personality embodied
in his works.'
French authors were first granted the exclusive right of reproduction
in 1791,41 and performance in 1793.42 These two decrees were con-
cerned solely with the pecuniary rights protected under Anglo-American
copyright law and acted as the bases for French copyright law until their
provisions were codified in 1957.43 From the beginning, however, it was
argued that even though the revolutionary legislature had theoretically
provided fine artists with the same rights as authors of books, drama, or
music, the fine artists were in fact unable to equally exploit their works
because of the unique nature of paintings and sculptures.
44
Despite the initial focus on the economic rights of authors, the French
courts gradually acknowledged that creations of intellect were funda-
mentally different than other forms of property, since a work of art is not
simply an object but is also an embodiment of its creator's thoughts and
personality.4' Thus, the French courts concluded that an artist has a
permanent relationship with his or her art.' This profound insight into
36. DE PIERREDON-FAWCEIT, supra note 9, at 1-4.
37. 1& at 1.
38. Id.
39. IL
40. Id.
41. The Decree of Jan. 13-19, 1791 (Fr.), reprinted in DE PIERREDON-FAWCETr, supra note
9, at 1 n.1.
42. The Decree of July 19, 1793 (Fr.), reprinted in DE PiERREDON-FAWCETr, supra note 9,
at 1 n.1.
43. Hauser, supra note 8, at 13-14.
44. DE PIERREDON-FAWCETr, supra note 9, at 2.
45. Hauser, supra note 8, at 14.
46. Il at 14.
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the relationship between an artist and his work provided the justification for
French law to recognize that all artists have four perpetual and inalienable
moral rights. These rights are: (1) the right of paternity (droit a la
paternite);47 (2) the right of integrity (droit au respect de l'oeuvre); 4 (3)
the right to release (droit de divulgation);49 and (4) the right to withdraw
or modify (droit de retrait ou de repentir)5
The right of paternity gives an author the right to be recognized as the
creator of a work, the right to remain anonymous if desired, and the right
to not be associated with another's work.5 1 The right of integrity is often
characterized as the most important moral right. It gives a creator the legal
power to exercise control over a work, even after it has been sold or
transferred, and to prevent its alteration, distortion, or mutilation.'2 The
right to release provides the author an exclusive right to decide when a
work should be disclosed to the public.53 Finally, the right to withdraw
or modify is the most limited of the moral rights. It allows an author to
withdraw or modify a work even after it has been released to the public,
although the owner must be indemnified in advance for any damage that
will result from the withdrawal or modification.'
In most nations utilizing this copyright system, artists can never
transfer all of their interests in a given work. Since moral rights are
personal and perpetual, inhering in the author and not the work, the rights
cannot be transferred or waived.55 However, both the United Kingdom
and Canada have recently passed moral rights legislation that allows a
waiver of these moral rights. For these reasons, some French jurists have
suggested dispensing with the concept of "property" when analyzing
intellectual creations.56 While this approach has often been seen as
antithetical to the Anglo-American view that copyright is merely another
form of property capable of being owned and sold, it is in reality not in
47. Fortin c. Prevost-Blondel, 1865 D.P. II 243.
48. Sorel c. Fayard Freres, 1900 D.P. H 152.
49. Pourchet c. Rosa Bonheur, 1865 D.P. II 201.
50. Christine L. Chinni, Droit D'Auteur Versus the Economics of Copyright: Implications
for American Law of Accession to the Berne Convention, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 145, 153-4
(1992).
51. Id at 154.
52. Id. at 155.
53. Id. at 152.
54. Id. at 154.
55. Chinni, supra note 50, at 152 (citing Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral
Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1980)).
56. Hauser, supra note 8, at 15.
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conflict with Anglo-American laws.5 1 The United States recognized that
moral rights are necessary and desirable when it became a member of the
Berne Convention, which incorporates the French belief in moral rights into
its Article 6bis in 1989.58
B. The Droit de Suite Specifically
The concept of the droit de suite was first used in connection with the
artist's resale royalty right over one hundred years ago in an article by
Albert Vaunois. 59 A French attorney, Edouard Mack, then raised the issue
of the droit de suite in his 1896 report to the Berne Congress of the
International Literary and Artistic Association.' The Societe des Amis
du Luxembourg was formed in Paris in 1903 with the specific purpose of
enacting the droit de suite into law.6 Its draft proposal issued one year
later eventually served as the basis for the 1920 Act.62
Thereafter, the French press began promoting the droit de suite by
publicizing the economic difficulties of fine artists and the enormous
disparities between the original sale prices and the large resale sums
obtained by art dealers.63 Some oft-cited examples of this disparity
include the resale of a Degas painting originally purchased for 500 francs
and later resold in 1912 for 436,000 francs; Millet's Angelus, resold for a
million francs a few years after its original sale price of 70,000 francs; and
a portrait by Duval de l'Epinay, which had a resale price of 660,000 francs
just nine years after it was purchased for 5,210 francs.'
The plight of artists' heirs was given special emphasis in a widely
published drawing which showed an auctioneer pounding his hammer down
saying, "100,000 francs, gone!", while two children in rags sitting in the
front row shouted, "Look, one of Papa's paintings!" 65 The fundamental
unfairness of the art market middlemen reaping enormous profits while
artists and their families received nothing was summed up in one account
as "real gold for the speculator, fool's gold for the artist."
66
57. Chinni, supra note 50, at 156-57.
58. Id. at 157.
59. DE PIERREDON-FAWCEIT, supra note 9, at 2. The Vaunois Article was published in the
Chronique de Paris on Feb. 25, 1893.
60. Hauser, supra note 8, at 3-4.
61. Id.
62. I.
63. DE PJmaREDON-FAWCETr, supra note 9, at 3 (citations omitted).
64. id. at 2.
65. Id. at n.14.
66. Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
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As a result of these efforts by the popular press and other proponents
of the droit de suite, the French public supported efforts to legislate an
artist's resale royalty right. The rationale for the droit de suite was that the
fine artist was not protected under existing copyright laws simply because
of the nature of his work.67 This lack of protection was a clear defect of
the laws of 1791 and 1793, therefore "[iut [was] not alms [the authors]
ask[ed] [for], but a property right.,
61
The initial debates on the droit de suite were halted by World War I.
Though Abel Ferry, the original sponsor of the bill, was killed in the war,
the bill was reintroduced in 1918.69 It was adopted without further
discussion by both Houses of the French Parliament and signed by the
President on May 20, 1920.70 The law granted artists a right of partic-
ipation in the public sales of their works of art.7 ' The droit de suite
legislation required sellers of fine art to pay a percentage of the resale price
to the artist of any work sold at public auction. 2 Initially, this inalienable
right only applied to public sales because they could be controlled more
easily.73 Furthermore, the right belonged to the artist and his heirs for the
duration of the copyright.74
The most recent French version of the droit de suite is found in the
1957 Copyright Law.75 It now provides for the payment of a flat three
percent royalty on the resale price on all "graphic and plastic works" sold
for more than 100 francs, and subsists for the life of the author plus fifty
years.76 Since 1957 the droit de suite has been extended to sales "through
a dealer" as well as public auctions. However, since no rules implementing
this provision were ever issued, the resale royalty is in reality only
collected at auction.77
The droit de suite is collected in France primarily through two private
authors' societies: Societe de la Propriete Artistique et des Dessins et
Models ("SPADEM") and the Association pour la Diffusion des Arts
Graphiques et Plastiques ("ADAGP"). These societies are similar to
67. Il at 4.
68. Hauser, supra note 8, at 5 (quoting Abel Ferry, 1914 J.O., Chambre des Deputes, Doc.
parl., annexe 3423, at 150 et seq., 2d Sess. of Jan. 23, 1914).
69. DE PIERREDON-FAWCETr, supra note 9, at 4.
70. Hauser, supra note 8, at 5.
71. DE PIERREDON-FAWCEIr, supra note 9, at 4.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The Law of Mar. 11, 1957, No. 57-298, tit. I, art. 6 (Fr.).
75. Il
76. REPORT, supra note 19, at 12.
77. Ia at 22.
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ASCAP and BMI, the societies established to enforce composers' and
performers' rights in the United States.7 8
C. The Legal Justification for the Droit de Suite
The original concept underlying the droit de suite was participation
by the artist in the increase in value of his work over time as reflected in
a resale.79 This theory was objected to on the grounds of fairness, since
the artist was not required to share in any loss of the seller. In addition,
it was argued that it would be unfair to give this right to artists if it was
not given to all sellers of property.8"
Supporters of the droit de suite responded to these objections by
focusing on the unique nature of art and the "causal relationship" between
its creator and the subsequent increase in value of a work, which does not
exist with other forms of property.81 The primary justification for the
droit de suite lies in the legal recognition of the personal link between the
artist and his work, which acknowledges that art is not merely an economic
asset, but is a continuing projection of the artist's personality. Hence,
artists should be able to share in the subsequent exploitation of their works
through the mechanism of a resale royalty, at first based on the appreciation
in value and later on the sale price.
2
Further justification for the droit de suite as a new exploitation right
was found by contrasting the opportunities granted fine artists for
capitalizing on their works under existing copyright law with those given
to writers and composers. 3 The latter are able to share in the profits
generated by the subsequent mass production, recording, transmission, and
performance of their works, while the former create one-of-a-kind objects,
which cannot be copied, and hence cannot be exploited by their creator
beyond their initial sale.8
Yet, the original work of art is traditionally considered to have a
special quality that has no equivalent in other creative fields. An original
is generally viewed as "the one and only perfect embodiment of that work
which cannot be matched even by the best reproduction" and thus is the
78. kL at 26.
79. DE PIERREDoN-FAWCETr, supra note 9, at 11.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 1&
83. Paul Katzenberger, The Droit de Suite in Copyright Law, 4 INT'L REv. OF INDUS. PROP.
& CoPyPiGHr L. 361, 365-68 (1973).
84. DE PIERREDoN-FAWCEIT, supra note 9, at 18.
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only source of "complete artistic enjoyment. 85  This explains why
originals are so highly valued by art dealers and collectors.
It has been said that a logical consequence of the intrinsic value of
original works of fine art is that any transfer of ownership is, in effect,
another exploitation of the work because "a new circle of users" are
provided with this perfect enjoyment, which could only be accomplished
through its resale.86 Thus, critics of the resale royalty, who merely see a
transfer in the ownership of a tangible object when art is resold, are simply
wrong in arguing that the droit de suite is not analogous to the exploitation
rights given to other creators under copyright law.'
Eighty years ago Abel Ferry eloquently summarized the legal basis for
this new right in his report on the proposed droit de suite:
We are not asking for a share of the profits on a possible
speculation, but for .the extension of the laws on artistic
property, regardless of the existence of an appreciation or
depreciation in value. There is a gap in this developing branch
of the law on literary and artistic property. Literary men,
musicians, and playwrights are members of powerful asso-
ciations. They can exact for each recital, each performance,
each publication, a fee which occasionally gives them large
revenues. They derive their fortune from the people generally
while the painter earns his living from the single collector.
What he creates cannot be published but has, however, the
character of personal property and this is why the provisions of
a code drafted when literary and artistic property was not even
known are urged against him. While the property of other
intellectual workers is full and undivided, that of the artist is
incomplete.88
D. The Internationalization of the Droit de Suite
In 1921, one year after France's recognition of the droit de suite, a
similar statute was enacted in Belgium.89 Although the original rationale
of the resale royalty was to give artists the right to share the increase in
value of their work with the assorted middlemen in the art market, both the
85. Katzenberger, supra note 83, at 368.
86. Id.
87. Id at 368-69.
88. Abel Ferry, 1914 J.O., Chambre des Deputes, Doc. parl., annexe 3423, at 150 et seq.,
2d Sess. of Jan. 23, 1914.
89. DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 9, at 4.
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French and Belgian forms of the droit de suite were based on the sale price
alone. This made collection of the royalty much easier, but led to
characterizations of the droit de suite as "a new tax for the benefit of
artists." 90
As a result of these criticisms, when Czechoslovakia passed its version
of the droit de suite in 1926, it provided for the payment of a percentage
from the profit realized by the owner upon resale.91 This more concep-
tually consistent approach proved to be a failure. Because it was too
difficult to monitor prior sales prices, the calculation of any appreciation
became practically impossible. 2 Thus, the droit de suite became "the
prisoner of its own logic," betraying its historical justification when based
on the sales price and becoming highly impracticable when based on the
appreciation in value.93
The jurisprudential confusion about its proper legal basis slowed the
spread of the droit de suite. By 1941, only Poland, Uruguay, and Italy had
adopted the resale royalty.94 Despite these problems, the droit de suite
was given new life when it was introduced, albeit as an optional provision
for member states, at the Berne Convention at the Brussels Conference of
1948.' 5 Since then, it has made its way into the copyright laws of twenty-
eight countries, although substantial royalties are only collected in Belgium,
France, Germany, Hungary, and Spain.96
In more recent years, a droit de suite provision was included in the
model copyright law for developing countries. 97  Eleven additional
countries expressed approval for the resale royalty principle in response to
90. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. DE PIERREDON-FAWCETF, supra note 9, at 5.
95. Article 14ter originally appeared as Article 14bis in the Brussels version of the Beme
Convention, June 26, 1948. The English translation of its text reads as follows:
(1) The author, or after his death the persons or institutions authorized by national
legislation, shall, with respect to original works of art and original manuscripts of
writers and composers, enjoy the inalienable right to an interest in any sale of the
work subsequent to the first transfer by the author of the work.
(2) The protection provided by the preceding paragraph may be claimed in a
country of the Union only if legislation in the country to which the author belongs
so permits, and to the extent permitted by the country where this protection is
claimed.
(3) The procedure for collection and the amounts shall be matters for determination
by national legislation.
Beme Copyright Union: Item H-I, at 7, CLTW Supp. (1972).
96. REPORT, supra note 19, at 140-41.
97. Tunis Model Law on Copyright and Commentary § 4bis, 10 COPYRIGHT BULL. 10, 15-16
(1976).
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a questionnaire distributed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") and the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") in 1983.98 In what may prove to be the single
most important development leading to the eventual enactment of the
artist's resale royalty in the United States, the European Community is
currently considering legislation that would harmonize and generalize
European droit de suite statutes in order to create "an internal market of
undistorted competition in which cultural goods and services [will] flow
unimpeded."'
Il. DROIT DE SUITE EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Beginnings
The artist's resale royalty first became an issue in the United States
in 1948 in connection with the sale of Grant Wood's painting, Daughters
of the American Revolution." When an art dealer resold this painting
for four times the original price shortly after its purchase from Wood, the
angry painter vowed that all of his future sales contracts would stipulate
that he would receive fifty percent of the profits from each subsequent
resale.' ° While the art industry had developed various forms of contrac-
tual resale royalty provisions," 2 they were seen as inadequate substitutes
for a legislated right under copyright law. This was primarily because of
the unequal bargaining position of younger artists and problems relating to
privity of contract.'0 3
The first proposals for bringing the formal droit de suite to the United
States were made in two seminal law review articles published in the early
1960's." 4  It was not until 1973, however, that the idea of a resale
98. The eleven countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Dominica, Greece, Mexico, Poland, Rwanda,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Upper Volta, and Zaire. Barbara Ringer, Book Review, 16 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 247, 251 n.20 (1992).
99. Theodore M. Shapiro, Droit de Suite: An Author's Right in the Copyright Law of the
European Community, 4 ENT. L. REV. 118, 124 (1992).
100. Neil F. Seigel, The Resale Royalty Provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act: Their
History and Theory, 93 DICK. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988).
101. lId
102. The best known of these little-used contracts is the Artists' Reserved Rights Transfer
and Sale Agreement or 'Projansky Agreement'. It was drafted by the New York art lawyer,
Robert Projansky. LEONARD D. DuBoFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 862 (1st ed. 1978).
103. Seigel, supra note 100, at 2; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
104. Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed
Enactment for the United States, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 19 (1966-67); see also Hauser, supra note
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royalty became well-known."0  The widely reported confrontation
between painter Robert Rauschenberg and art dealer Robert Scull over the
enormous profit made on the resale of one of Rauschenberg's works
brought the issue to the public's attention.' 6 Within five years of that
incident, Congress and the Ohio and California state legislatures introduced
the first resale royalty bills.' 7 However, only California passed the droit
de suite into law. 8
B. The California Resale Royalties Act
California State Representative Alan Sieroty introduced the first state-
sponsored droit de suite legislation in 1975." ° His bill was initially
defeated. Upon reintroduction the next year, it was signed into law by
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr."' Surprisingly, considering the
controversy that had always surrounded the droit de suite, the California
Act was passed with little fanfare or opposition from either side of the
debate."'
The law went into effect on January 1, 1977 and requires the seller
of any work of fine art 2 sold for more than $1000 to withhold five
percent of the resale price for the benefit of the artist, provided that the
resale price is greater than the original purchase price."3 If the artist
cannot be located within ninety days by the seller, the royalty must be
transferred to the California Arts Council which may use the money to
purchase public art if the artist is not found within seven years."'
The law only applies if the seller is a resident of California or if the
sale takes place there.1 15 In addition, the artist must either be a resident
8.
105. Seigel, supra note 100, at 3.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The City of Seattle was actually the first U.S. jurisdiction to recognize an artist's right
to a resale royalty in its "Art in Public Places" ordinance. Seattle, Wash. Ordinance, 102,210,
cited in Leonard D. Duboff, Artists' Rights: The Kennedy Proposal to Amend the Copyright Law,
7 CAwozo ARTS & Er. LJ. 227, 230 (1989).
110. Report, supra note 19, at 42 of Appendix, Part II.
111. John E. McInerney III, California Resale Royalties Act: Private Sector Enforcement,
19 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 7 (1984) (quoting Cal. A.B. 1391, at 11 (May 12, 1975)).
112. The California statute defines "fine art' as "an original painting, sculpture, drawing, or
an original work of art in glass." CAL. Civ. CODE § 986(c)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
113. Id. at § 986(a)(1).
114. Id at § 986(a)(2), (5).
115. Id. at § 986(a).
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of California for two years or be a U.S. citizen."6 To collect, the artist
must bring an action under the Act for damages and reasonable attorney's
fees within three years of the resale or one year of receiving actual notice
of it, whichever is later."7 The artist cannot waive the right to receive
resale royalties, although he can assign the right to collect them."8
Royalties must be paid to an artist's heirs for twenty years after the death
of the artist." 9
Shortly after its enactment, the constitutionality of the California
Resale Royalties Act was challenged by art dealer, Howard Morseburg.' °
He claimed that the Act violated the United States Constitution's Due
Process and Contracts Clauses.' In addition, Morseburg argued that the
federal Copyright Act of 1909 preempted the legislation.
22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the
California Act in Morseburg v. Balyon. 2 Finding no violations of the
Due Process or Contracts Clauses, the court restricted its preemption
analysis to the 1909 Act. 24 It looked for guidance from prior United
States Supreme Court decisions involving the possible federal preemption
of state laws regulating intellectual property and their progeny."
Specifically relying on the rule laid down in Goldstein v. California,
126
the Ninth Circuit held that the 1909 Act: (1) did not expressly prohibit the
enactment of a state droit de suite law and (2) could not reasonably be
interpreted to imply such a prohibition on the grounds that such legislation
impermissibly interfered with the exclusive rights to vend or transfer a
copyrighted work. 27 Nevertheless, because of the unambiguous language
116. Id. at § 986(c)(1).
117. CAL. Civ. CODE § 986(a)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
118. Id. at § 986(a).
119. Katherine F. Rowe, Visual Arts: Moral Rights and Resale Royalties, in ADVANCED
WORKSHOP ON CoPYRiGHT LAW 1991, 307,400-401 (PLI Pat., Copyright, Trademark, & Literary
Prop. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 312, 1991).
120. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
121. Id. at 974-77.
122. Id. The Copyright Act of 1909 was revised in 1976, but it did not become effective
until after the date of the Morseburg purchase. Therefore, the court did not address the issue.
123. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
124. "We do not consider the extent to which the 1976 Act, particularly section 301(a) and
(b) ... may have preempted the California Act:' Id. at 975.
125. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
126. 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state legislation making the pirating of sound recordings a crime
not preempted by federal copyright law where Congress had left the area unregulated).
127. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 977-78.
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found in both the legislative history128 and the text of the Copyright Act
of 1976,129 there are serious doubts about whether the California resale
royalty statute could withstand the same kind of scrutiny under the current
copyright law.
30
The results of California's droit de suite are mixed, largely because
the law requires the often uncooperative seller to withhold the royalty from
the resale price, find the artist, and send him the proceeds. In a 1986
survey of artists conducted by Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts ("BALA"),
thirty-two percent of the respondents said dealers had refused to give them
the name or address of the buyer or even the resale price, despite their right
under the law to assign collection of the royalty to another. In a comment
submitted to the Copyright Office as part of its study of the droit de suite,
California arts attorney Peter Karlen stated that artists are unable to collect
their royalty because art dealers "feel they can get away with it.,' 3' He
also noted that many galleries will not deal with an artist who demands a
written agreement. Even if the artist gets the gallery to agree to a contract,
he must still rely on the dealer to provide all of the information regarding
128. According to the House Report, the policy of Section 301 was "intended to be stated
in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable
misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively.... ." H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1976).
129. Section 301(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act reads:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,
whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such
right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any
State.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
130. See Lynn K. Warren, Comment, Droit De Suite: Only Congress Can Grant Royalty
Protection for Artists, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 111, 128 (1981):
Since the 1976 Act makes it abundantly clear that once a copyright owner divests
himself of ownership of a particular copy of his work, all his distribution rights,
including the economic benefits of distribution, cease; therefore, the California
Resale Royalties Act must fail. The five percent royalty conferred on the copyright
owner upon resale extends the economic benefit he derives beyond that received
from the original distribution of his work. Congress stressed that a state law is
equivalent to copyright and subject to preemption even if the precise contours of
the state-created right may not be coextensive with the comparable right under the
Copyright Act of 1976. Therefore, although the conditions which the California
statute places upon the distribution right of the copyright owner do not control that
limited right, it sufficiently conflicts with congressional intent to be abrogated and
preempted by the 1976 Act.
Id (citations omitted).
131. Sky, supra note 24, at 317.
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the resale, and to collect the royalty. Many dealers fail to do so for months
or even years.'32
Proponents of the California resale royalty maintain that it benefits
large numbers of artists and encourages more artistic production just as the
public performance right stimulates the creativity of composers. Despite
the difficulty of enforcing the current version of the law, art advocates as
well as studies commissioned by BALA, 33 show that many California
artists have received significant royalty payments. 1"M These results
confirm similar studies done in France that have demonstrated that large
numbers of French artists have substantially benefitted from the droit de
suite since its adoption in 1920.135
Since 1976, two additional jurisdictions in the United States have
enacted resale royalty provisions. Georgia recognizes the droit de suite as
part of its "Art-in-State-Buildings Program." In this program, the state
agrees to pay a royalty upon the resale of any art purchased with public
funds other than as part of the sale of a building.136 In 1988, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto .Rico passed a comprehensive moral rights law, that
includes a requirement that sellers must pay a five percent royalty to the
artist from the profit realized on the resale of a work.' 37
C. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA")
Unsuccessful efforts to amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to include
the droit de suite have been made in both Houses of Congress periodically
since the late 1970's. Representative Henry Waxman of California
132. ld.
133. See Alma Robinson, BALA [Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts] Surveys Artists and
Galleries on Resale Royalties, BALA-Gram, NovJDec. 1986, at 1, reprinted in Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1619 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
134. Goetzl, supra note 28, at 255; see also REPORT, supra note 19, at 71 (At the January
1992 hearings on Artists' Resale Royalties in San Francisco, at least two artists testified to
positive experiences and significant financial gain from the California statute. Richard Mayer,
sculptor and Vice President of National Artists Equity Association, reported receiving resale
royalties of $25,520 in the last eight years. He reported that his experience was not unique. Ruth
Asawa, a sculptor whose work has been commissioned for public places, testified that she
received $5,000 when Ghiradelli Square was sold, and $7,000 when the San Francisco Hyatt was
sold, both sales included a resale of one of her fountains.).
135. Note, The Applicability of the Droit de Suite in the United States, 3 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 433, 440 (1980); see also REPORT, supra note 19, at 156 (chart showing that in
1990 approximately $14.5 million in resale royalties were collected in France).
136. GA. CODE ANN. § 91-507(c) (Michie 1991).
137. 31 PuERTo Rico CIV. CODE § 1401(h) (1991).
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introduced the Visual Artists Residual Rights Act of 1978;"' later
versions of VARA were sponsored by Representative Thomas Downey'3 9
and by Senator Edward Kennedy' 40 in 1986, and Representative Edward
Markey of Massachusetts in 1987.1
41
The original Kennedy-Markey bill, which was primarily aimed at
guaranteeing visual artists the basic moral rights protections contained in
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, also provided for the payment of a
royalty of seven percent from the resale profit whenever the sale price of
a work of fine art was one hundred-fifty percent above the purchase
price." However, due to opposition from art dealers, gallery owners,
auction houses, and others, the resale royalty provision was dropped when
the bill was reintroduced in 1989. Instead, the Copyright Office was
required to study various ways visual artists could share in the increased
value of their work, including a resale royalty.1 43  When VARA was
ultimately passed in 1990, the requirement for a study on the feasibility of
enacting the droit de suite in the United States was retained.' 44
IV. THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS' REPORT ON RESALE ROYALTIES
As required by VARA, on December 1, 1992, the Register of
Copyright released to Congress its four hundred page, two volume report
on the artist's resale royalty. The Report is divided into five parts with an
Appendix volume and an executive summary. Part I provides an overview
of the history and evolution of the resale royalty in specific nations like
France, Belgium, Germany, Uraguay, and Czechoslovakia, as well as efforts
to enact droit de suite legislation internationally. Part II reviews the
American experience with resale royalties with a special focus on both the
California law and the various failed attempts to enact a Federal Resale
Royalty. Part Im contains the Copyrights Office's analysis of the testimony
given at hearings in New York and San Francisco and of the written
comments that were submitted. Part IV examines the various arguments
made by the proponents and opponents of the droit de suite. Part V
explains the conclusions and recommendations of the Copyright Office
138. H.R. 11403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
139. H.R. 5722, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
140. S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
141. H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
142. Rowe, supra note 119, at 402.
143. I at 403.
144. VARA, supra note 17, at § 608(b) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1976 & Supp.
1992)).
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regarding the artist's resale royalty. The Appendix volume contains copies
of the comment letters and transcripts of the hearings analyzed in Part
I.
4 5
Although the Register ultimately advised Congress not to adopt the
droit de suite, it was clear that this advice was not absolute. The Report
was based solely on the non-exhaustive evidence that was gathered by the
Copyright Office during a limited period of time. The Register merely
concluded that it was "not persuaded that sufficient economic and copyright
policy justification exist[s] to establish the droit de suite in the United
States."' 46 While the Report ultimately opposed the immediate enactment
of a federal resale royalty, it hedged its conclusion by saying that
"[Congress may want to take another look" if the European Community
decided to harmonize its droit de suite legislation and extended it to all of
its member States. 47
The Report attempted to address the economic concerns of fine artists
by suggesting that if they do need additional means for exploiting their
work, there are a number of possible alternatives to the droit de suite.
These alternatives include a broader public display right, a commercial
rental right, compulsory licensing, and increased federal funding for the
arts148 Lastly, the Report included a model droit de suite system that
Congress could consider in the event that it decided "the time [was] ripe
for introduction of droit de suite in the United States."'49
Soon after its release, both the methodology and substance of the
Report were seriously questioned by a proponent of the droit de suite,
Professor Shira Perlmutter of Catholic University.' Among other things,
her article, "Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of
Copyrights' Report," provides a thorough critique of the way evidence was
gathered and evaluated by the Copyright Office, spotlights the one-sided
nature of many of the Report's "findings," and persuasively rebuts the
many arguments routinely made by opponents of the artist's resale
royalty.1
5 1
The fundamental problem with the Report is that it draws its primary
conclusion from a false assumption. It assumed that it could accurately
145. For excerpts from the New York hearing, see Copyright Office Hearings on the Droit
de Suite, 16 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 185 (1992).
146. REPORT, supra note 19, at 149.
147. Il
148. Id. at 149-51.
149. Id at 149.
150. See generally Perlmutter, supra note 24.
151. l
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predict what the ultimate effects of a federal resale royalty would be on the
market generally and fine artists specifically. The assumption was based
solely on a single theoretical study of the California law's impact.1 52 It
made this prediction despite its own admission that it did not have
sufficient, current, and empirical evidence on the resale market nor on the
amount of income that artists earn from the first sale of their works.
153
Professor Perlmutter's close examination of the Report revealed that
despite the seemingly equivocal nature of its findings, it was written with
a stylistically negative tone, and utilized a methodology that seemed to
prejudge the merits of the proposed droit de suite. 54 As a result,
evidence on both sides of the argument was neither weighed nor interpreted
even-handedly. Real evidence of the positive impact of the droit de suite
in California and in Europe was given less weight than abstract arguments
against it.
55
Throughout the Report, the arguments of the opponents of the droit
de suite were accepted on their face, while proponents' arguments were
given strict scrutiny and found to be unconvincing. 56 The final result of
this flawed approach was that even though the majority of the evidence
gathered by the Copyright Office indicated support for resale royalties,
157
the "vocal minority" of art dealers, auction houses, museums, and corporate
copyright holders that opposed them ultimately prevailed.
151
Since the artist's resale royalty was first proposed one hundred years
ago, four major arguments have been consistently made by its opponents:
(1) it would damage the existing market for fine art; (2) it would be too
difficult to enforce; (3) it would benefit too few artists; and (4) it would be
unfair to base it on the resale price.
15 9
The first argument against the droit de suite contends that it would
actually hurt artists by driving away investors and depressing initial prices;
those in the art market will anticipate the eventual need to pay a resale
royalty."6 In an attempt to support this argument, the Report cited the
152. Ben W. Bolch, William Damon & C. Elton Hinshaw, An Economic Analysis of the
California Art Royalty Statute, 10 CONN. L. REV. 689 (1978).
153. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 286.
154. Id. at 287.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. REPORT, supra note 19, at 99.
158. For a complete list of the persons and organizations who submitted comments and/or
testified for the Copyright Office, see Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 288 nn.17 & 18.
159. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 313.
160. REPORT, supra note 19, at 142; Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 295.
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testimony of two leading opponents of the droit de suite, Stephen Weil16 1
and Professor John H. Merryman. 62 These men emphasized that "the
artist may really suffer from a resale royalty."'63 Despite this equivocal
testimony, Professor Perlmutter pointed out the Report nevertheless claimed
that the 1978 study164 used in Weil's article, and relied upon heavily by
the Copyright Office, "found" the primary market prices were depressed as
a result of the California law. 65 Perlmutter rebutted this key assumption
by asserting that "the study does not provide any evidence of the actual
effect of royalties on the primary market, but simply sets forth the authors'
own speculation based on economic theory."1"
Most importantly, the Report simply ignored the evidence gathered
from jurisdictions with decades of experience with the droit de suite. A
good example of this disregarded evidence is the 1986 California Lawyers
for the Arts survey, which showed that 100% of the art dealers responding
said the royalty had no significant effect on their sales.167 In the New
York hearings, John Weber, a dealer who represents numerous artists with
resale royalty provisions in their contracts, testified that, in twenty years,
he had never seen an original sales price reduced nor had he lost a single
sale, because of the possible need to pay a resale royalty.16
France, Germany and Belgium are the acknowledged leaders in
administering and collecting the droit de suite.169  Yet given little
apparent weight was the testimony of representatives from those countries
who reported that over the years they have experienced a constant increase
in the amount of royalties collected, yet have witnessed no reduction in
primary sales. The French, inventors of the droit de suite, insisted that,
relative to the United States and the United Kingdom (two leading non-
resale royalty art markets), their market share has remained steady.1 70
Mr. Ted Feder, the President of Artists Rights Society, summarized the
proponents' counter-argument when he testified that: "Some claim that the
161. See Stephen E. Weil, Resale Royalties: Nobody Benefits, ARTNaws, Mar. 1978, at 58.
162. See generally, Merryman, supra note 23.
163. REPORT, supra note 19, at 103 (emphasis added).
164. Bolch, et al., supra note 152.
165. REPORT, supra note 19, at 103 n.29: "[A Vanderbilt University Study] in 1978 found
that royalties depressed prices in the primary market and that most artists never made up the
initial loss."; see also Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 295.
166. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 296.
167. Sky, supra note 24, at 319.
168. REPORT, supra note 19, at part 111, pp. 48-80; Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 296; Sky,
supra note 24, at 319.
169. REPORT, supra note 19, at part IV.
170. Id. at 189; Sky, supra note 24, at 319.
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right would drive down the first or subsequent sales price of original works
of art, causing hardship to the creators. However, in no country with the
resale right has this been known to happen...,,m
Furthermore, as Professor Perlmutter's article made clear, opponents
of the droit de suite contradict themselves with this claim since, as noted
below, they also argue that resale of fine art is so infrequent that too few
artists will benefit from a resale royalty for it to be worthwhile. 72 If this
is true, how could it possibly have such a negative impact on the American
art market, as claimed by the dealers and auction houses?
173
A related assumption underlying this argument is that collectors buy
fine art primarily for investment purposes. 74 Thus, it is argued that if
payment of a resale royalty is required, reducing investors' potential profit,
they will cease investing in fine art altogether and put their money where
it will bring a better return. 5 In reality, almost all collectors purchase
specific works of art simply because of their uniquely personal aesthetic
appeal. "They want to look at it, live with it at home, and show it to
others,"'7 6 and if they were merely motivated by the possibility of making
money, stocks and bonds would be far more rewarding investment vehicles
than fine art."
The Copyright Office was specifically asked to study possible
enforcement mechanisms for collecting the droit de suite, since another
argument consistently made by opponents is that it would be too difficult
to enforce. As noted above, in France, Germany, and Belgium, various
artists' societies have for years successfully distributed substantial amounts
of resale royalties collected from sales at auction houses. While experience
has shown that it is difficult to collect the royalty from dealer sales as well,
Germany has had success with both. 8 Nevertheless, the Report warned
that if a resale royalty were passed by Congress, collection from galleries
would be a "challenge," and there would be a "risk of non-compli-
ance."'
179
171. REPORT, supra note 19, at 99.
172. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 298.
173. i
174. Id at 298; see also Sky, supra note 24, at 320.
175. Sky, supra note 24, at 320.
176. Id.
177. Id; see testimony of Eleanor Dickson, REPORT, supra note 19, app., part I, at 41:
"Most people buy art because it's prettier than stock on their walls."
178. REPORT, supra note 19, at 42; Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 307 n.101.
179. Sky, supra note 24, at 321.
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Since law enforcement is always challenging, and instances of non-
compliance inevitable, little weight can be given to this objection to the
droit de suite. After all, "[iln the modem world, difficulties of detection
and enforcement of copyright infringement are common, and legislative
solutions can rarely provide complete relief."18  Despite that fact, for
decades, composers' societies have been attempting to collect royalties for
every time copyrighted music is played in bars and nightclubs throughout
the nation, certainly a more difficult task than collecting on the sale of a
single object.' In sum, "[i]mperfect solutions are better than none,""82
and "if there were [never any] risk of non-compliance, we would not need
most of our laws.' 8. 3
Opponents of the droit de suite have also argued that too few artists
would benefit from it because some studies have shown that very few
artists ever have their works resold.'84 Yet Professor Perlmutter noted
that the studies relied upon by the Report to show that the resale market
was too small to justify the droit de suite were seriously flawed and limited
in scope, since they did not include gallery or collector sales, were
conducted over a short period of time, and primarily focused on sales at
auction houses with minimum prices of $10,000 or more.8 5  It is
obvious, however, that the fundamental problem with these studies is that
"[tlhe auction sales are the tip of the iceberg," and cannot serve as a true
measure of the real dimensions of the resale market for fine at.186
When considering artists' experience with the California Resale
Royalty Act, the Copyright Office cited a survey which indicated that few
artists or dealers had been involved in the collection of a resale royalty.'8
7
This created the assumption that this was a further indication that there was
an insufficient resale market for fine art, instead of drawing "[t]he more
obvious conclusion ... that the California statute is poorly enforced and
underutilized - a conclusion that is virtually unanimous on both sides of
the issue."'88
180. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 307.
181. Sky, supra note 24, at 321.
182. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 307.
183. Sky, supra note 24, at 321.
184. REPORT, supra note 19, at 103-05; Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 303.
185. REPORT, supra note 19, app., part I, at 213-14; Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 303.
186. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 303.
187. REPORT, supra note 19, at 104; Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 303.
188. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 303-04.
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While it was evaluating an admitted paucity of information about the
American experience with resale royalties," 9 convincing evidence on both
the scope of the French resale market and the beneficial effects of the droit
de suite on French artists was ignored.19  Jean-Marc Gutton, General
Manager of ADAGP, testified that more than $17,000,000 in resale
royalties were collected and distributed to more than 1700 artists in
1990,'9' and that the droit de suite benefitted far more artists than
reproduction rights. 92 Furthermore, 1600 of those artists shared approx-
imately $8,000,000, while only 50 artists received more than $40,000 each.
These figures, from one of the two French collection agencies, clearly
show: (1) that a sizeable resale art market exists in France; and (2) that a
resale royalty benefits a significant number of that nation's artists, not just
the established ones.1
93
It is obvious that a few famous artists will benefit more from a resale
royalty than the vast majority of lesser known ones, but this is merely the
logical result of a fair market that by its very nature provides more rewards
to those who achieve greater popularity than to those who do not.
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect all fine artists to forfeit this
potentially lucrative reward simply because, as in any other enterprise,
those who have the greatest success will benefit the most. Furthermore,
this art market "fact of life" does not alter the reality, as evidenced in the
hearings, that lesser known artists would still derive significant benefits
from the payment of small resale royalties.' 94 In short, for American fine
artists, (75% of whom are estimated to earn only $7,000 per year from the
sale of their work):
195
Even a royalty of fifty dollars may allow an artist to purchase
supplies sufficient to create her next work of art-or to pay the
electric bill, allowing her to continue to create rather than
devoting all her time and energy to finding another job.1 96
189. REPORT, supra note 19, at 145: "Because the Copyright Office lacks sufficient current
empirical data about several important facts.... Any conclusions that we could make about the
number of artists who would benefit from the resale royalty must be based, therefore, on
anecdotal evidence and limited sample size. Most significantly, there is no clear evidence
indicating the frequency of resale of works of fine art."
190. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 304; Sky, supra note 24, at 321.
191. REPORT, supra note 19, app., part III, at 15-16.
192. Il at 45; Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 304.
193. Sky, supra note 24, at 321.
194. See testimony of Richard Mayer. Report, supra note 19, at Appendix Part II, pp. 41-46;
Perimutter, supra note 24, at 305.
195. Sky, supra note 24, at 322.
196. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 305.
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Lastly, an attack that has been made upon the droit de suite from its
beginnings, and one repeated in the Report, is that "there is something
inherently unjust... in permitting an artist to benefit from increases [in the
value of his work upon resale], without having to share the risk of
loss."" While admitting that granting a resale royalty only to works of
art that appreciate sounds reasonable on its face (i.e., returning to the
original jurisprudential basis for the droit de suite),198 Professor Perl-
mutter countered this argument by noting that the few nations that have
used this approach found it to be impractical and impossible to enforce,
which has led to subsequent droit de suite systems being based on the
resale price alone."9 Ultimately, however, this criticism of the resale
royalty simply ignores the fact that:
[M]ost authors are treated no differently. Because they do not
typically exploit their own work, but assign rights to a pub-
lishing, recording or production company which invests in
bringing the work to the public, they benefit from a combination
of up-front payments and royalties, without being expected to
share in the risk of loss.2'
V. THE CASE FOR THE DROIT DE SUITE
A. Ending Copyright's Unfair Treatment of Fine Artists
For copyright purposes, a work of fine art has been likened to
Cinderella: appreciated for its unique beauty by those who look upon it,
yet subject to continuing unfair exploitation by those who control it.201
While nominally granted copyright protection by Congress in 1870,2 2 the
sui generis20 3 nature of the fine arts has never been fully recognized by
the law.' 4 Consequently, artists are not allowed to profit from the
197. REPORT, supra note 19, at 135.
198. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 306.
199. REPORT, supra note 19, at 13, 48. "In France, Germany, and most other countries with
a droit de suite, this method of measuring the proceeds right has become accepted as a matter of
expediency. Measuring the resale royalty by the sales price is considered simplest and most
practical since it is not necessary to keep a record of the previous sales prices."
200. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 307.
201. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503
(1945).
202. Act of July 8, 1870, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. § 86 (1870).
203. See generally Millinger, supra note 26.
204. Brenner, supra note 26, at 85:
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increased value of their work to the same extent as writers and com-
posers. 5  Until Congress passes droit de suite legislation, or some
equivalent, this inequity in the American copyright scheme will remain.'
The subject matter of copyright has expanded steadily since the first
federal copyright law was passed over two hundred years ago.
Originally limited to books, maps, and charts, copyright protection was
subsequently granted to etchings,' °8 musical compositions,2' dramatic
compositions,21° and photographs.2 1 The Act of 1870 finally extended
copyright for the first time to paintings, drawings, statues, and designs
"intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts.
212
The existing copyright rights of reproduction and performance,
however, have proven to be nearly valueless because works of fine art are
inherently incapable of being reproduced or performed in the traditional
sense.2 3  Furthermore, although the 1976 Act gave fine artists the
potentially valuable right to display their work publicly,2 4 as a practical
matter, the first sale doctrine terminates this right upon its sale.215 Thus,
the purchaser has the right to show a painting or a sculpture in a gallery or
museum without having to obtain permission from the artist and without
having to pay any royalty for its display.216 In sum, "the golden eggs of
copyright for works of art seldom materialize, and when they do, they
appear to have been laid by a hummingbird, not a goose.
'2 17
Unlike the fairy tale, however, there has been no happy ending to the protection of
fine arts under our copyright scheme, at least not yet. Thrown into the copyright
statute in the dusk of 1870, the fine arts to this day are grouped with other creative
output that bear important functional differences. Those differences have not been
accounted for by Congress and the courts however ....
Id.
205. Millinger, supra note 26, at 355.
206. 1& at 376.
207. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
208. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (repealed 1831).
209. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
210. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870).
211. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (repealed 1870).
212. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 212 (repealed 1904).
213. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 290.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
215. Id. § 109(a), (c).
216. Perlmutter, supra note 24, at 290 (citation omitted).
217. Brenner, supra note 26, at 97.
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Since its origins in Roman law, copyright has concentrated on
protecting creations capable of being reproduced or "copied" rather than on
individual objects. 218 Fine art, however, is fundamentally different from
the other subject matter of copyright. Unlike books, plays, songs, music
and motion pictures, the ultimate value of fine art lies in its unique quality
as a one-of-a-kind original, not in its potential for mass reproduction or
performance. 219  New technologies for reproducing, recording, and
transmitting literary and musical works have enriched the creators of those
works by providing payment of additional royalties. On the other hand,
fine artists continue to make only a meager living solely from the initial
sale price of their work. They are completely cut off from any further
participation in the subsequent economic exploitation of their work.'
Thus, given these inherent limitations for the economic exploitation
of fine art by its creator, the traditional rights granted other creators should
be augmented with an additional right, the droit de suite, which acknowl-
edges the fine arts' "special mode of creation."22' A resale royalty right
is grounded in the same underlying copyright principle as other economic
rights; that an author should participate adequately in every commercial
exploitation of his work. "Such an exploitation of a work of the fine arts
occurs with every sale of the work .. ,'222 While the droit de suite is
not an exclusive right since it does not allow the artist to prevent the
further sale of his work, it is quite similar in nature to a compulsory
license, long-recognized in American copyright law, in that the holder of
the right is entitled to a royalty every time his work is resold.' By
amending the Copyright Act to include a resale royalty, Congress will
finally recognize that fine artists have been unfairly denied a right given to
all other authors - the right to share in the future economic success of
their works.
B. Fulfilling the Original Intent of the Copyright Clause
The Constitution's Copyright Clause gives Congress the power "to
promote the progress of useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
the exclusive right to their writings."224 The Clause was modeled after
218. See ARTHUR W. WEiL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 3-15 (1917).
219. Brenner, supra note 26, at 86.
220. DE PIERREDoN-FAWCEiT, supra note 9, at 18.
221. L at 29.
222. Katzenberger, supra note 83, at 367-368.
223. DE PIERREDON-FAWCEIT, supra note 9, at 29.
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
DROIT DE SUITE
the Statute of Anne, England's first copyright law, which was passed in
1709.225 Although one commentator states that the legal theory of
copyright only emerged after the invention of movable type in 1476,'
Blackstone argued that English copyright's true origin was in Roman
property law. 7 More importantly, one of the primary purposes of both
English copyright law and its American descendant has always been to
reward the creation of "useful art" by providing economic incentives for its
creators. Adding the droit de suite to the Copyright Act would further the
original intent of the Copyright Clause by "promoting the progress" of the
fine arts. It would give artists the potentially lucrative right to participate
in the increased value of their work.2
Charles C. Pinckney and James Madison are generally given credit for
drafting the Copyright Clause. 9 The Clause was adopted and signed by
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention meeting in Philadelphia on
September 17, 1787.2'0 It is important to note that its authors inten-
tionally avoided using the term "copyright" in its text, which allowed the
Congress to expand copyright's protection far beyond the subject matter of
the late eighteenth century."3
The provision was uncontroversial, generating no debate in the
convention or during the ratification process. 2  However, the most
authoritative source of constitutional intent, The Federalist, contains a
passage written by Madison that makes it clear that since American
copyright was based on the English common law right, "[t]he utility of this
power will scarcely be questioned [because] [t]he public good fully
coincides.., with the claims of individuals."' 3
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this basic
copyright principle in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.234 Citing language from
225. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1-11 (Eng.).
226. H. RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 17 (1956).
227. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 406 (1966); see also E.H. POLLACK, JURIS-
PRUDENCE 107-08 (1979).
228. Comment, Copyright: Droit De Suite: An Artist Is Entitled to Royalties Even After
He's Sold His Soul to the Devil, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 493, 509 (1992).
229. See Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
17 GEO. LJ. 109 (1929).
230. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES (H.1. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 706, 745 (1975)).
231. Fenning, supra note 229, at 116.
232. 2 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 340
(Joseph Culbertson Clayton ed., 1896).
233. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
234. 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994).
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Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,235 the Court stated
that the Copyright Clause was intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward which must
ultimately serve the public good.26  In short, rewarding the artistic
success of individual artists through a resale royalty fulfills the original
intent of the Copyright Clause: it gives them an economic incentive to
create additional works of art, thus further promoting "the Progress of...
useful Arts.'2 7
C. Recognizing Copyright's Foundation in Natural Law
Opponents of the droit de suite have argued that it is incompatible
with Anglo-American copyright law because of its distinct origin in French
law." Yet, a careful analysis of the historical development of both the
English law of copyright and its civil law counterpart in France reveals a
common root in natural law.29 It is generally acknowledged that the
evolution of moral rights was heavily influenced by natural law juris-
prudence,' ° but copyright's common law beginning as a natural, per-
petual right is almost completely forgotten.24 The early misreading of
a leading British copyright case242 by the United States Supreme Court
led to the erroneous conclusion that Anglo-American copyright was derived
solely from a statutory grant.2' 3 Proper recognition of English copy-
right's foundation in natural law helps reconcile the apparent differences
between American and French copyright law and provides an additional
argument for passing droit de suite legislation in the United States.
235. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
236. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1029.
237. ld. at 1030 (quotations omitted).
238. Alderman, supra note 23, at 267. "The resale royalty, or droit de suite .... is a foreign
concept born of different social and legal systems, and is antithetical to the Anglo-American
tradition of free alienability of property."
239. Robert C. Hauhart, Natural Law Basis for the Copyright Doctrine of Droit Moral, 30
CArd. LAW. 53, 61-62 (1985).
240. Id. at 64.
241. See Kauffman, supra note 29. "Copyrights are commonly argued to be purely statutory.
And, of course, they are. From this, however, it is further argued that copyrights are only
discretionary privileges, not natural, [perpetual] rights. This does not follow. A statute will often
codify preexisting rights." Id. at 388 (citations omitted).
242. Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774).
243. Kauffman, supra note 29, at 409.
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Natural law is one of the oldest known legal theories,' with two
of its earliest advocates being Plato and Aristotle.245 Plato thought it was
natural for law to tend toward "the discovery of the ideal form of perfect
law,"2 6 while Aristotle noted the difference between natural justice and
conventional justice.247 The primary emphasis of early natural law was
determining what was ethical and just as abstract principles common to all
of humanity.
Cicero, the Roman lawyer and orator, was a student of the Stoics who
revived the study of natural law248 and introduced the concept of jus
gentium," or universal law, into Roman law. It is probable that
Cicero influenced Gaius, an early commentator on Roman law who argued
that natural law was derived from the reason of man, and hence provided
the civil law with a non-theistic, philosophical basis. 1 The first known
citation to natural law theory in the context of literary property appears in
Gaius' treatise on Roman law.
252
The Greco-Roman theory of natural rights was reasserted by Thomas
Aquinas and other Christian philosophers in the twelfth century as a result
of the rediscovery of the Roman Law Digests.25' Since then, there has
been a conflict between believers of natural law theories and those who
support the concept of positive legal codes. '"The former relies on
reason and conscience to recognize universal, fundamental truths; the latter
binds men because of sanctions built into social relationships and enforced
by the state."'25 Modem parallels to this dichotomy can be seen in the
philosophical differences between the French tradition of moral rights and
the American history of positive copyright law.
256
244. EDWIN W. PATYERSON, JURISPRUDENCE MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 6 (1953).
245. Hauhart, supra note 239, at 58 (1963).
246. Ia (citations omitted).
247. Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS IN THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS
21 (Morris 1959)):
A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not
depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first instance
may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been
settled it is not indifferent.
248. PATTERSON, supra note 244, at 343.
249. IL
250. Ia
251. Ia at 342.
252. Hauhart, supra note 239, at 59 (citation omitted).
253. l. (citing GEORGE WITECROSS PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 99 (4th ed.
1972)).
254. Ld. at 60.
255. Id. (citations omitted).
256. Il
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Even though Anglo-American copyright is generally thought to be a
purely positivist creation today, there is ample evidence that early English
copyright was based on the same natural law jurisprudence as French
copyright.- s Blackstone's restatements of the law of literary property
relied upon the theories espoused by Gaius in his treatise on Roman
law," 8 and Blackstone affirmed the natural law origin of literary
justice.259 The debates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries among
authors, booksellers, the public, and the Crown, which ultimately led to the
passage of the Statute of Anne, were filled with references to natural law
and the "inalienable" rights of authors.26 The first case to examine
closely the legal basis of English common law copyright, Millar v.
Taylor,26t clearly reveals the influence of natural law:
The common law, now so called, is founded on the law of
nature and reason. Its grounds, maxims and principles are
derived from many different fountains ... from natural and
moral philosophy, from the civil and canon law, from logic,
from the use, custom and conversation among men, collected out
of the general disposition, nature and condition of human
kind. 6z
In Millar, England's highest court at the time, the Court of the King's
Bench, was called upon to decide what effect the Statute of Anne had on
an author's common law copyright. The suit arose when bookseller Robert
Taylor sold several copies of a work without the permission of Andrew
Millar, even though he had previously purchased all rights in the book from
its deceased author.263 While the Crown had long recognized that
English booksellers had a perpetual property right in the works they owned
prior to the enactment of the Statute of Anne, these sales had occurred after
the twenty-eight year term of protection provided for in that statute. 
264
Was copyright still property to be held in perpetuity by its owner?
Blackstone, arguing for Millar, claimed that:
[T]here is a real property remaining in authors, after publication
of their works; and that they only, or those who claim under
them, have a right to multiply the copies of such literary
257. Hauhart, supra note 239, at 65.
258. aL (citing 2 WILL Am BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 404-07).
259. Kauffman, supra note 29, at 404.
260. Hauhart, supra note 239, at 65.
261. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
262. Id. at 223.
263. Id. at 204-05.
264. Kauffman, supra note 29, at 399.
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property, at their pleasure, for sale... [and] that this right is a
common law right, which always has existed .... 265
The terms "property" and "common law right" were used interchangeably
at that time,26 ' and most importantly, both concepts were accepted by all
four judges to be natural rights derived from natural law and justice.267
Further, three of the four also agreed that common law copyright was
perpetual in duration,268 despite the statute's imposition of a twenty-eight
year limitation. Thus, Millar recognized that authors have a natural
property right in the fruits of their labor that had always existed at common
law and was now merely codified by the Statute of Anne.269
Five years after the issues in Millar were decided, the House of Lords
reexamined them in a case with substantially similar facts, Donaldson v.
Beckett.27 In what one proponent of the natural law of copyright
characterizes as the pivotal mistake among the "five accidents in copyright
law, ' 271 the Donaldson court concluded, in a 6-5 vote, that common law
copyright had been completely supplanted by the statute, despite its
"frequent admission that the natural and common law were the sources for
rights that had been incorporated into the Statute of Anne."272  Thus,
English copyright was erroneously transformed from an innate right of
authors derived from natural law into "nothing but a statutory privilege, a
mere gift from Parliament."273
The United States declared its independence from Great Britain two
years after Donaldson, but the new nation was still influenced by the
English common law, including its original view of copyright as a natural
right of authors.274  Further, the two most far-reaching events of the
eighteenth century's Age of Enlightenment, the American and French
Revolutions, were both fundamentally based on natural law theories.275
265. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.
266. Kauffman, supra note 29, at 399.
267. Id. at 399 n.86. "[Tihe law of England with respect to all personal property, had its
grand foundation in natural law." l
268. "The property of the copy... [may] go down from generation to generation, and
possibly continue for ever, .. ." Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 251.
269. Kauffman, supra note 29, at 401.
270. 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774).
271. See Kauffman, supra note 29, at 386-414.
272. Hauhart, supra note 239, at 66.
273. Kauffman, supra note 29, at 401.
274. Id. at 403.
275. Jefferson's Declaration of Independence is premised on natural law principles: "We
hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal; they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights .... Thomas J. Brogan, The Natural Law and the Right
to Liberty, 4 NoTRE DAME NAT. L. INST. PRoc. 24, 26 (Edward F. Barrett ed. 1951); "French
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It is clear that the Founders were influenced by the natural law theories of
Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau when they were drafting the Consti-
tution's provisions, including its guarantees that the government shall not
violate the inalienable rights of American citizens.276
The Copyright Clause was originally intended to promote the public
good by rewarding those responsible for the creation of useful works.'
Its co-author, James Madison, must have been aware of the decisions in
Millar and Donaldson since he cited their holdings in The Federalist. "The
copy right [sic] of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to
be a right at common law."278 Despite this constitutional history, which
was based on Donaldson's acknowledgement of a common law copyright
now codified and limited by the Statute of Anne, the United States
Supreme Court, in Wheaton v. Peters,279 denied that such a common law
right ever existed. In the American view, "statutory protection [of
copyright] not only secured common law rights and superseded them, it
essentially negated and replaced them."
280
The existence of a common law copyright derived from natural law
was reaffirmed, however, in the dissenting opinions of Justice Thompson
and Justice Baldwin.28' In Justice Thompson's opinion, common law
copyright was "established in sound reason and abstract morality,"2 2
which was protected by the "principles of right and wrong, the fitness of
things, convenience and policy." 3  Nevertheless, by disregarding
Madison's belief that the Copyright Clause merely gave Congress the
power to secure the natural right of authors at common law, as Parliament
did with the Statute of Anne, the Wheaton majority's misunderstanding of
the true origins of Anglo-American copyright became precedent,2 4 and
was later incorporated into the legislative history of the 1909 Act.285
scholars regard the droit l'auteur as a natural right, deeply rooted in the principles of the French
Revolution from which modem French jurisprudence emerged." Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral
and the Amoral Copyright, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 7 (1980).
276. HEINRICH A. RoMmN, THE NATURAL LAW 75-109 (Thomas R. Hanley trans. 1947);
see also 2 JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1690).
277. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
278. Id.
279. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
280. Hauhart, supra note 239, at 67.
281. lId at 68.
282. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at- 672 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
283. 1l at 671.
284. Kauffman, supra note 29, at 411.
285. "[Copyrights are] not based upon any natural right .... The Constitution does not
establish copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it
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Despite this disavowal by the courts and Congress, early American
commentators continued to recognize natural law's contributions to the
development of common law and statutory copyright protections for
authors."s6 In addition, the natural law basis of all copyright laws
provided a legal rationale for the first supporters of an international
copyright treaty,'s7 who ultimately prevailed with the worldwide adoption
of the Berne Convention.28
Clearly, the legal basis of Anglo-American copyright can be found in
natural law, since early Roman law theories of literary property were used
by English judges to affirm the pre-existence of a common law copyright,
which was later codified and then relied upon by American courts. The
Founders of the United States, living in an age which exalted the concept
of natural rights, clearly relied on these and other natural law principles
when drafting the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution,
including the Copyright Clause. Hence, while it is generally assumed that
the French origins of the droit moral and the droit de suite are incom-
patible with United States copyright theory, a careful examination of the
history of British and American copyright demonstrates their shared
reliance on natural law.2 9 Thus, the enactment of a resale royalty by
Congress, which is often characterized as both a moral right and an
economic right, would be an appropriate recognition of the natural law
foundations of both French and Anglo-American copyright law.
D. Adhering to the Provisions of the Berne Convention
On October 31, 1988, President Reagan signed the Berne Convention
Implementation Act ("BCIA"), which required adherence to its provisions
by the United States after March 1, 1989.290 The moral rights protections
thinks best." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
286. Hauhart, supra note 239, at 68 (citation omitted).
287. Id. (citation omitted).
288. It.
289. Hauhart, supra note 239, at 69.
mhe philosophical origin of the theory of the author's creative and moral rights
may be found in natural law. Natural law theories of property found in the early
Roman law and adopted by the English provide one source of data... The best
argument that can be made is that the droit moral has its philosophical roots buried
deeply in natural law theories that permeate both the later English and American
common law and the natural rights movements of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and
twentieth centuries. IL
290. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "BCTA"].
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provided by Article 6bis291 of Berne had always been one of the major
obstacles preventing U.S. adherence in the past.2" This reluctance to
expressly adopt the provisions of 6bis was overcome when Congress
characterized Berne as an executory treaty requiring implementing
legislation before it could take effect.293
Before passing such legislation, Congress appointed the Ad Hoc
Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention ("Working
Group") to examine U.S. law and to determine whether there were rights
existing under state and federal law that could be analogous to the moral
rights provisions of the Berne Convention.2 94 Despite disagreement
among copyright experts,295 the Working Group concluded that the
United States already adequately protected moral rights,296 thus elimi-
nating the need for any additional recognition in the implementing
legislation. In fact, the BCIA explicitly states that United States adherence
to Berne did not create any new rights for authors.' Some commen-
tators, however, still question the accuracy of these unilateral declarations
291. Article 6bis states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
Berne Copyright Union: Item H, art. 6bis, reprinted in Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLtM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 547
(1986) [hereinafter "Berne Report"].
292. Chinni, supra note 50, at 148. See also Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its
History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1 (1988); Ralph Oman, The United States
and the Berne Union: An Extended Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1 (1988).
293. Doriane Lambelet, Internationalizing the Copyright Code: An Analysis of Legislative
Proposals Seeking Adherence to the Berne Convention, 76 GEO. L.J. 467, 479 (1987) (citations
omitted).
294. Rowe, supra note 119, at 393.
295. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 655 (1986).
296. The Berne Report states:
Given the substantial protection now available for the real equivalent of moral
rights under statutory and common law in the U.S., the lack of uniformity in
protection of other Berne nations, the absence of moral rights provisions in some
copyright laws, and the reservation of control over remedies to each Berne country,
the protection of moral rights in the United States is compatible with the Berne
Convention.
Berne Report, supra note 291, at 535.
297. "Ihe provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto,
and satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an
author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State or the common law .. " BCIA, supra
note 290, at § 3(b).
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by Congress that no new federal legislation is needed to fulfill our
obligations under the treaty. 9
As noted previously, the droit de suite is properly seen as an
additional moral right derived from the right of paternity, even though the
1948 Brussels Revision of Berne recognized its unique status as half moral
right and half pecuniary right by providing for its enforcement in a separate
article.299 Despite the fact that Berne's droit de suite is currently an
optional provision for its eighty-five member nations, twenty-eight
countries have already enacted a resale royalty right and many more nations
are considering it."
The United States is one of the world's largest exporters of copy-
righted works, which generate billions of dollars of trade surplus each
year.30' As such, the United States has worked to ensure international
protection for those works by acceding to the Berne Convention and by
becoming a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATI').3 2 Because Berne has provided a detailed and comprehensive
international copyright system for over one hundred years, members of
GAITf have looked to Berne for guidance in resolving problems involving
trade-related aspects of copyright, especially piracy.30 3 When United
States accession to Berne was being considered by Congress, Senator
Charles Mathias, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, stated that "GATT
requires a mature standard of copyright principles as a yardstick for
evaluating trade barriers. The Berne Convention provides that yard-
stick." 3° Thus, both the Berne Convention and GATT can be seen as
part of a larger world-wide movement to provide uniform protection for
intellectual property rights through the creation of an international body of
law.3
05
Five years ago, the United States finally signed the Berne Convention
after decades of resisting pressure to change United States copyright law,
298. See, e.g., Chinni, supra note 50, at 173. "If American law currently provides the
minimum protection for moral rights required by article 6bis of the Berne Convention, it does so
only barely." Id.
299. For a discussion of the droit de suite's hybrid nature see supra notes 9-11 and
accompanying text.
300. DE PIERREDON-FAWCE1T, supra note 9, at 6.
301. Crabbs, supra note 30, at 167.
302. GAT seeks the promotion of international free trade through the lowering or
elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers. See Lambelet, supra note 293, at 472 n.21.
303. Lambelet, supra note 293, at 472 n.21 (citations omitted).
304. 132 CONG. REc. S14,508-09 (1986).
305. Crabbs, supra note 30, at 168.
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which fell short of the minimum standards required by the Berne Conven-
tion.306 In 1988, Congress declared in the BCIA that there was no need
to legislate additional moral rights protections in order to adhere to the
Berne Convention. 7 Nevertheless, Congress enacted VARA two years
later to make those protections more explicit, at least for visual artists,30 8
and helped bring American law into closer compliance with the inter-
national copyright scheme provided by the Berne Convention.39
Ironically, now that the United States is a signatory, there is a major
obstacle in the way of this reluctance to harmonize U.S. copyright law with
Berne. The one hundred year history of Berne revisions shows a clear and
continuing trend toward increased protections for authors, more uniform
protections for copyright holders, as well as a steady increase in moral
rights provisions for artists, which were first added in 1928.3"0 Whenever
future revisions to Berne are added as mandatory provisions for all member
nations, future compliance with Berne will require Congress to adhere to
them in some manner, because Article VI of the Constitution declares that
"all [t]reaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land...., 31'
This nation is now part of an international community that recognizes
the necessity and desirability of moral rights for artists generally, and to an
increasing extent, the droit de suite specifically.3 2 The United States
should assume the leadership position that the proper international
protection of its valuable copyright exports require. 13 Rather than
waiting to see if the members of the European Economic Community enact
more uniform protection of the droit de suite, Congress should recognize
that current protections for fine artists will not be adequate for compliance
with Berne over the long term.314 Congress should amend the Copyright
Act to include a resale royalty as provided in Article 14ter, thus moving the
United States another step closer to full adherence with both the letter and
the spirit of the Berne Convention.
306. Chinni, supra note 50, at 146.
307. Id. at 166.
308. Id at 167.
309. I at 174.
310. Id at 161.
311. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
312. DuCHEmIN, supra note 32, at 149.
313. Crabbs, supra note 30, at 174.
314. Chinni, supra note 50, at 174.
DROIT DE SUITE
VI. CONCLUSION
American fine artists should have the right to a resale royalty because:
(1) United States copyright law unfairly limits their ability to participate in
the economic exploitation of their work; (2) the droit de suite fulfills the
original intent of the Copyright Clause by promoting the creation of
additional works of fine art; (3) copyright is derived from natural law,
which recognizes the inalienable right of all creators to a continuing
relationship with their work; and (4) it is in the long term interest of the
United States to become a leader in international copyright law by
voluntarily adhering to the droit de suite provisions of Article 14ter of the
Berne Convention.
One commentator predicted nearly thirty years ago that reaction to an
artist's resale royalty would be divided into "two classes: dealers in art
work and everyone else. '315  Even though art dealers routinely take
fifteen to twenty-five percent commissions from the sale and resale of fine
art, their trade associations and lobbying groups strenuously object to an
additional three to five percent for the artists who create the work
itself.316 As recently as 1988, a dealer resold a painting by Jasper Johns
for $17.1 million, yet Johns received nothing.3" As one droit de suite
proponent put it, "Why should artists be the only socialists in this capitalist
society? If they are successful, why shouldn't they get richer just like
anyone else?"3 8 Fundamental fairness requires that fine artists be given
the same economic opportunity under the Copyright Act as other creators.
One of the underlying objectives of the Copyright Clause is to
promote the progress of the arts. The United States Supreme Court, in its
unanimous decision in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 319 reaffirmed this basic
copyright principle when it stated that the Copyright Clause was intended
to motivate creativity "by the provision of a special reward.' '320 There
can be no doubt that an American droit de suite would be such a special
reward.
It is said that the droit de suite is a French moral right incompatible
with Anglo-American copyright. A closer examination of the historical
origins of copyright law in France and England shows that the copyright
315. Schulder, supra note 104, at 43.
316. Idt
317. Goetzl, supra note 28, at 255 (citation omitted).
318. Id
319. 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994).
320. I1 at 1029.
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traditions of both nations share a common foundation in natural law. The
leaders of the French and American Revolutions were heavily influenced
by natural law principles and believed that natural justice for all people
could be achieved by relying on reason and conscience to recognize
universal, fundamental truths.
Since natural law underlies both United States and French copyright
law, it is reasonable to insist that American fine artists be given the same
rights as their counterparts in France. Congress can achieve a fitting form
of natural justice321 by enacting a resale royalty, which is a unique blend
of moral and economic rights.
The United States adhered to the provisions of the Berne Convention
six years ago. Since then, Congress has acted to fulfill its treaty obli-
gations by explicitly guaranteeing certain moral rights for visual artists as
required under Article 6bis. This nation can further enhance its leadership
role in promoting international copyright law by passing legislation that
creates, in accordance with Article 14ter of the Berne Convention, an
American version of the droit de suite.
321. "What is justice, if not the proportion between cause and effect, between work and
compensation?" Report on the bill on literary property submitted by Alphonse de Lamartine to
the Chamber of Deputies on Mar. 13, 1841.
